Sweden Goes Global: Francophonie, Palme, and the North-South Dialogue during the Cold War

Andreas Mørkved Hellenes
Carl Marklund

The authors
Andreas Mørkved Hellenes is a PhD student in contemporary history at the Centre d’histoire, Sciences Po Paris and the University of Oslo, where he is finishing his thesis Fabricating Sweden. Productive Moments in the 20th Century History of Swedish Public Diplomacy in France. His main research interests are Scandinavian identities, transfer and circulation studies and the history of international relations.

Carl Marklund is a historian and political scientist at the School of Culture and Education, Södertörn University, whose recent major publications include The Paradox of Openness (Leiden: Brill, 2014) and All Well in the Welfare State? (Helsinki: NordWel, 2013). His research interests include history of international relations, media studies, Scandinavian studies, and STS.

Abstract
Decolonization and the rise of the “Third World” opened up a new front in the global Cold War. In response, neutral and non-aligned states faced the complex choice of either adapting to or challenging the bipolar order. In this context, Sweden gradually embraced a highly profiled “active foreign policy” in the interest of East-West détente, North-South dialogue and so-called Third World solidarity. In particular, Swedish Social Democratic Prime Minister Olof Palme played a crucial role in establishing “small state interests” as a discursive alternative to the antithetical bipolarism of the Cold War during his first terms in power (1969-1976). As such, Palme’s activities as a public diplomat in the emerging progressive universe of networks, debating fora and expert bodies were widely noted in the emerging global public opinion of the Cold War era. In this paper, we explore two related dimensions in Palme’s Cold War public diplomacy: 1) Sweden as both a global neutral and a possible social model, both of which must be interpreted from the perspective of the ideological contest of the Cold War; and 2) Palme as a public intellectual in probing alternatives to pervasive Cold War bipolarism, focusing upon the early 1970s as a key moment in Cold War North-South conflict.

Key words: Cold War; North-South dialogue; Olof Palme; public diplomacy; Sweden.

Résumé
« La Suède mondiale: Francophonie, Palme et le dialogue Nord-Sud pendant la guerre froide »

La décolonisation et la montée du « tiers monde » ont ouvert un nouveau front dans la guerre froide mondiale. En réponse, les États neutres et non alignés ont dû faire face au choix complexe de s’adapter ou de contester l’ordre bipolaire. Dans ce contexte, la Suède a progressivement adopté une « politique étrangère active »
largement orientée vers l’intérêt de la détente Est-Ouest, du dialogue Nord-Sud et de la solidarité dite du tiers monde. Le Premier ministre social-démocrate suédois Olof Palme a joué un rôle particulièrement crucial dans l’établissement des « intérêts des petits États » comme alternative discursive au bipolarisme antithétique défendu par les blocs de la guerre froide au cours de ses premiers mandats (1969–1976). En tant que tel, les activités de Palme en tant que diplomate publique dans l’univers progressiste émergeant de réseaux, forums de débat et organes d’experts ont été largement notées dans l’opinion publique mondiale de la guerre froide. Dans cet article, nous explorons deux dimensions liées à la diplomatie publique de la guerre froide de Palme : la Suède à la fois comme modèle mondial de neutralité et modèle social possible, qui doivent être interprétés du point de vue de la lutte idéologique de la guerre froide ; Palme en tant qu’intellectuel publique explorant les alternatives au bipolarisme généralisé de la guerre froide, en nous concentrant sur le début des années 1970, moment clé dans le conflit Nord-Sud de la guerre froide.

**Mots clés:** guerre froide ; dialogue Nord/Sud ; Olof Palme ; diplomatie publique ; Suède.

Decolonization and the rise of the so-called “Third World” opened a new frontier in the global Cold War.¹ Old neutral as well as new non-aligned states across the world faced the complex question of either adapting to or challenging the bipolar order. In response, Sweden gradually moved from a cautious and often legalistic line of non-alignment to a more high-profile “active foreign policy” from the mid-1960s and onwards, promoting East-West détente, North-South dialogue and Third World solidarity.²

In his capacity as Swedish Prime Minister (1969–1976, 1982–1986) and Chairman of the Swedish Social Democratic Party (SAP, 1960–1986), Olof Palme played an important role in establishing North-South “small state solidarity” as an alternative to the antithetical bipolarism between the Cold War blocks. While drawing on a rich internationalist legacy within the Swedish Social Democratic movement, Palme went further. He explicitly sought to bridge the rift between affluent but minor “developed countries” of the Global North such as Sweden on the one hand and often naturally rich but economically disadvantaged “developing countries” of the Global South on the other. In both shaping and reflecting the growing New Left sensibilities of Swedish public opinion, Palme strived actively to establish multilateral progressive networks – for example in the UN and Socialist International – as well as bilateral contacts with individual states across the Global South, aiming at bypassing or defusing the dichotomizing logic of the Cold War.³

Palme’s advocacy was widely noted in the emerging global public opinion of the Cold War, attracting an inordinate amount of attention to both Palme’s own activities as well as the political and social life of Sweden, from supportive progressives as well as conservative critics. While previous Swedish outreach efforts had mostly focused upon Anglophone countries, especially the USA, the increasing international significance of Swedish foreign policy from the late 1960s and onwards placed Sweden in the midst of Cold War tensions and contributed to expanding the scope of its public diplomacy efforts beyond the West.⁴

In this article, we explore how Palme’s and Sweden’s bilateral public diplomacy contributed to the formation of Sweden as a global neutral, committed to Third World solidarity as well as a social model of economic efficiency and social equality during the Cold War. These two images reinforced one another and must be interpreted from the perspective of the world-encompassing ideological contest of the global Cold War. In Odd Arne Westad’s influential account, decolonization opened up a new front in the global Cold War, where the superpowers competed not only with regard to material interests but also on ideological grounds, seeking to validate their opposed socio-economic systems. The global South emerged as a “middle ground,” where Cold War conflicts played out in the shape of proxy wars and interventions, which spelled both opportunities and risks for smaller neutral states, in the North as well as in the South. In addressing the diversity of this emerging global opinion regarding these two primary facets of Sweden, the article first discusses metropolitan French receptions of Palme and Sweden and then provides outlooks to Swedish outreach efforts directed at two newly independent Francophone countries in the Third World, Senegal and Algeria, analysing the sensitivities of postcolonial encounters and Cold War North-South (inter)dependencies.

There are three primary reasons for expanding the study of the Cold War image of Sweden beyond the Anglophone sphere, looking at both metropolitan France as well as the Francophonie. First, French-speaking intellectuals and politicians played a key role in shaping tiers-mondisme – not the least in the wake of the First Indochina War and the Algerian Civil War – French statistician, demographer and government counsellor Alfred Sauvy having coined the term “Third World” in 1952. Second, as the Trente Glorieuses were coming to a close, metropolitan French political debate took an extraordinary interest in the “Swedish model” of combining “capitalist” production with “socialist” redistribution, which eventually became so central that it was accorded a term of its own, suédomanie. Third, it allows us to address the key function of the multi-lingual, charismatic and cosmopolitan Swedish Prime Minister in combining and shaping these dual images of Sweden globally, while making use of emerging global media.

---

Suédomanie in de Gaulle’s and Pompidou’s France

In the late 1960s, as France’s economic growth slowed down and French political radicalism rose, references to Sweden began to appear at the centre-stage of French social debate. The “Swedish model” was introduced as a solution to French problems by the journalist and politician Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber in his 1967 book Le défi américain; later followed a series of publications on the topic – some of them scientific, others written for a large public – that became the object of polemics in the press. French politicians, too, started to make frequent references to Sweden. Not the least, centrist reformers took an explicit interest in Swedish social democracy.

This growing interest in France was noted by the Government of Sweden. In response Servan-Schreiber and some fifteen French journalists were invited to Sweden in the revolutionary year of 1968 to follow up on the success of Le défi américain. In the same year, the Press Division of the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) began to compile annual reports entitled “Sweden in Foreign Press” (Sverige i utländsk press, henceforth SIUP) that sought to present and evaluate how the country was perceived in overseas press. While the coverage of Sweden in foreign press was deemed to be predominantly negative in the annual report for 1968 – mainly as a result of the worsened Swedish-American relations – France represented a notable exception. The MFA reported that it was now “unthinkable” for a serious newspaper treating the future of French social conditions to not include Swedish perspectives; in France, Sweden had evolved into the primary example when it came to social policy, economic planning and autonomy in foreign policy.

In particular, the international media coverage of Palme contributed to the image of Sweden. Palme’s own travel itinerary reflects the increasingly international relevance of Swedish politics: In 1970, “Europe’s youngest premier” made a tour of important European capitals: London, Bonn, and then Paris. Later, in the same year, he visited Moscow as well as the United States – unofficially, due to the conflict with the Nixon Administration, speaking on decolonization at UN General Assembly in New York. From a publicity point of view, these travels were considered highly successful by the press officials at the MFA.
In Paris, Palme’s fluent French impressed the Parisian journalists, and he participated in interviews in both TV and radio. European affairs stood at the centre of his official visit, involving the question of the entry of Great Britain and, possibly, also of Sweden, in the European Economic Community (EEC). Swedish neutrality played a key role in this: in Paris, Palme declared for example that he was not sure that a complete Swedish adhesion to the EEC would be compatible with neutrality, defined by him in interviews as “the refusal to adhere to any pact, to any bloc,” but also noting that this “does not by any means exclude personal convictions or engagements.”

Additionally, domestic Swedish politics such as the consequences of the recent wildcat strikes in the mines of Lapland for the Swedish model was another key theme in the press coverage of the visit. In his press conference in Paris, as well as in numerous interviews, Palme emphasized that Sweden did not see itself as a model: When the “Swedish Kennedy,” as some newspapers called him, was interviewed by the journalist Claude Brovelli in primetime on the public broadcaster Office de Radiodiffusion-Télévision Française (ORTF), Palme stressed that stiIl saw social problems and important political tasks ahead for Sweden – even if Pompidou had humorously declared his political vision for France as modelled upon Swedish experiences in the Presidential campaign of 1969 – “avec un peu plus de soleil.” To L’Express, Servan-Schreiber’s influential news magazine, Palme had similarly stated, immediately after his accession to power, that the modern welfare state still had a thousand shortcomings, and that “our task is immense.” While Swedish public diplomats regarded this position as a nuancing of the image of Sweden in France, it could also evoke notions of Palme’s radicalism, not being satisfied with current achievements: where the senior Erlander had represented the continuity and stability of Swedish social democracy, the youthful Palme came to represent a rejuvenated Swedish socialism that prepared itself for a new stage – “crossing the socialist Rubicon,” in the words of Alfred Sauvy.

In addition to his dynamic character in domestic politics, the critical stance of Palme’s Sweden towards the American warfare in Vietnam and support of national liberation movements across the Third World echoed sentiments held by many

---

19 L’Express was seen as a frontrunner for French interest in Sweden; according to Jean Bothorel, the Scandinavian country was a “référence obligée” for the Parisian news magazine during these years. Marc Ullmann, “Suède. M. Palme devient le premier des égaux,” L’Express, December 6, 1969; Jean Bothorel, Celui qui voulait tout changer. Les années JJSS (Paris: Robert Laffont, 2005), 348.
21 Alfred Sauvy, Le socialisme en liberté (Paris, 1970), 88; see also Nordling, op. cit., 186.
within the radical French Left. But also in terms of high politics there were commonalities to be explored. Both France and Sweden were attempting, from their admittedly highly distinct vantage points, to probe an independent course in response to the changing geopolitical and ideological conflict patterns of the Cold War in the wake of the rise of the so-called Third World. Hence, Swedish active foreign policy and global engagement interested French foreign policy pundits. President Charles de Gaulle’s *politique de grandeur* after the end of the Algerian War in 1962 sought to limit the power and influence of both superpowers and to re-establish France as a first-rate world power with the support of non-aligned Third World countries, sceptical of bipolarism. De Gaulle frequently took policy positions which collided with US preferences, for example criticizing the Vietnam War and recognizing the People’s Republic of China while identifying potential partners among France’s former colonies in Africa and the Middle East, a policy which his successor Georges Pompidou followed through.

Against this background, it is not surprising that the second foreign-language translation of Palme’s 1968 book *Politik är att vilja*, after Finnish, was in French. Published in 1971 as *Socialisme à la scandinave*, the back cover of this collection of Palme’s articles and speeches of the past decade advertised it as an opportunity for the French reader to get to know the thoughts of an “intelligent and generous statesman,” who conceives his nation “as an open city, and not a fortified one,” and who, always, “remains passionate about all human problems.”

After Palme’s 1970 visit in Paris, press attaché Dieter Winter at the Swedish Embassy in Paris discussed the image of Sweden in France in a report entitled “Suédomanie in a modified form.” Publicity about Sweden in the French press was perhaps not comparable to that of the *annus mirabilis* 1969, “the year when the spontaneous interest in Sweden due to French internal political circumstances suddenly became so strong that one could talk about a ‘Suédomanie.’” Winter stated: “We have done our best in abstaining from sending up too many groups of journalists in order not to risk a Sweden-satiation in French press.”

This “de-dramatization of French perceptions of Sweden” did not signify a change for the worse or a loss in goodwill. While *suédomanie* soon abated, the generally positive view of Sweden – both as a social model and as a global neutral – remained in France for years to come, in contrast to the evolution of the Sweden image in Great Britain

---

24 For a study connecting these French post-colonial power ambitions to both France-Germany relations and to the economic and trade policies of the EEC, see Peo Hansen and Stefan Jonsson, *Eurafrica: The Untold History of European Integration and Colonialism* (London: Bloomsbury, 2014).
and West Germany, where increasingly critical reporting on Sweden became more frequent during the 1970s, often directly reflecting the negative views of US conservatives.28

**L’homme de l’année in the Third World**

Palme’s and Sweden’s positive publicity in France and French-speaking media globally also meant an opening towards the Francophonie as the hexagonal debates about the Swedish model echoed outside of metropolitan France: the Canadian French-language press wrote positively about Palme’s Sweden and the Swedish model appeared not the least in the rhetoric of Pierre Trudeau, Canadian Prime Minister from 1968. Third World press, where some of the first globally oriented publications were in French and published in Paris, also picked up on the theme of Palme’s Sweden as a beacon of progressivism. In addition to Sweden being analysed in a special issue of *Le Monde diplomatique* in 1971,29 Palme was interviewed by the influential Pan-African weekly *Jeune Afrique*, edited in Paris, which also presented articles about Swedish positions on development aid policy, Africa and Vietnam under the heading *Suède rime avec aide*.30

Palme did play a personal role in expanding the initially modest Swedish development aid programme during Erlander’s time in office in the 1960s. Supervised by Palme, the first government bill on public development assistance had been adopted in 1962, and a public agency, NIB (Nämnden för internationellt bistånd), was created. Popularly referred to as the “development aid Bible,” the bill stated that the main goal of Swedish development cooperation should be to “raise the standard of living of the poor peoples” through focusing on four main areas: economic growth, economic and social equalization, economic and political independence, and democratization.31 In 1965, the Swedish International Development Authority (SIDA) was constituted, and Sweden adopted the “one per cent target” in 1968, i.e. the idea that one per cent of the GDP should be allocated to development aid, directed at a growing number of newly decolonized countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America.32

---

It has been suggested that Palme’s relative failure to bring Swedish welfare state ideas into the debate on the European level provided an extra momentum for his engagement with the Third World. Admittedly, as the Swedish negotiations with the EEC came to an end, increased contacts with African leaders and stronger support to the national liberation movements in Southern Africa followed. The Swedish MFA’s annual reports also noted that although Sweden’s star seemed to wane in the European press, it shone stronger in other parts of the world. Palme’s visits to Julius Nyerere’s Tanzania and Kenneth Kaunda’s Zambia in September 1971, prepared in earnest from the Swedish side, received massive international press coverage and the enthusiastic welcome extended to Palme in both African countries was happily relayed back to Stockholm.

But Palme’s global engagement was not limited to bilateral contacts with so-called Third World leaders. In June 1972, the Swedish Prime Minister hosted the UN Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm. The international conference had been in preparation since 1968 and drew some 1,300 representatives of foreign media to the Swedish capital. This gave Palme an unprecedented opportunity to situate the current tension between Sweden and the USA in the broader context of the global North-South conflict, citing US military engagement in Vietnam, involving massive aerial bombing, mine-laying, and usage of defoliants, as a form of “environmental warfare” directed at the Third World. Press across the Global South applauded Palme and republished many of his articles and speeches, some of which had been translated and communicated by the Prime Minister’s foreign policy advisor Pierre Schori. A former diplomat and international secretary of the Social Democratic Party, Schori enjoyed excellent access to French, Spanish, and Latin American intellectuals. One of his contacts was the Syrian-Egyptian journalist Simon Malley, who founded the Paris-based monthly Afrique Asie in 1969. During the winter of 1973, Malley made a long interview with Palme, where he further developed a global perspective on recent international affairs: disarmament negotiations in a European capital should be seen together with the liberation struggles in Mozambique, Angola, Guinea-Bissau, and Vietnam. After discussing Palme’s friendship with the recently assassinated Bissau-Guinean political leader Amílcar Cabral, Malley asked what had made Olof Palme’s Sweden the first Western country to support African liberation movements with public funds. Palme answered that “...there is a sort of historical affinity between Sweden and the poor nations that fight against underdevelopment, colonialism and oppression. Sweden was also a land of peasants, poor, and underdeveloped. As a small country, we also raised up to defend our national independence and our politics of non-alignment. [...] This is why we

33 Ekengren, op. cit., 233.
34 SIUP 1971, 52–53.
38 Pierre Schori, Minnet och elden (Stockholm: Leopard, 2014), n° 22, 277.
have always considered colonialism and apartheid as crucial obstacles to a policy of détente, as a veritable danger to world peace.”

Swedish historian Kjell Östberg has observed how this image of an *affinité historique* became a regular feature of Palme’s vocabulary in his contacts with the Third World. Together with non-alignment and socialism this idea contributed to forming a figure of thought which placed Sweden in a natural league together with developing countries, underscoring that small states, whether advanced or developing had to work in close cooperation against the bipolar order of the Cold War.

In acknowledgment of Palme’s global engagement – epitomized by his widely noted criticism of the US “Christmas bombings” of Hanoi in December 1972 – the readers of *Afrique Asie* voted him “l’homme de l’année” in July 1973, also confirming Sweden’s solidarity with the Third World. According to the magazine, Palme had proven that rich Western countries such as Sweden did not necessarily have to subscribe to egotistical exploitation. Increasingly, the image of Sweden began to fuse with the image of Palme in the emerging transnational public opinion of the Global South by the early 1970s.

The growing interest in Palme and Sweden across the so-called Third World led to a considerable increase in countries represented in SIUP from 1970 and onwards. This publicity could be assessed as an interesting mirror for Sweden’s international engagement by its public diplomats. Based on the publicity at hand, Swedish public diplomats concluded that the active foreign policy and the increased development aid increased goodwill for Sweden across the Third World.

As Swedish development cooperation grew in terms of ambition and resources throughout the 1960s, it also became a viable means to support national liberation across the Third World, both at home and abroad. Around the same time, the Swedish Institute (Svenska institutet, SI), a public foundation established in 1945 and financed by the Swedish MFA, observed an increased interest in developing countries in Sweden itself, also noting that Swedish exchanges with the developing countries could be expected to increase in the years to come. In response, the Institute expanded its outreach activities – until now mainly concerned with Western Europe and the United States – to the Third World. One favourite method was to approach Swedes with pre-existing contacts in these countries for networking purposes and in order to facilitate future outreach activities.

---

41 Östberg, op. cit., 109–110.
43 Marklund, op. cit., 177–178.
44 SIUP 1970, 40, 52.
Images du Nord in Senghor’s Senegal

In one of its first initiatives, the Swedish Institute launched a pilot “Africa project,” in collaboration with representatives of Swedish universities and research centres as well as organizations such as SIDA, the Nordic Africa Institute, the British Council, and – perhaps more surprisingly, but logical considering the East-West tension of the Cold War – the Polish Ministry for Culture. The Africa project identified four focus countries, based on a so-called theoretical structure model, i.e. criteria such as population density, income per capita, frequency of radio, TV and film, the quantity and quality of universities, museums, etc. The group also considered linguistic diversity, selecting two Anglophone countries, Nigeria and Kenya, and two Francophone countries, Tunisia and Senegal.47

Senegal became the first of the four countries to host a Swedish information and cultural manifestation, taking place in the capital Dakar in spring 1973.48 This West African country had been selected among the former French Sub-Saharan colonies primarily because of its developed infrastructure and its centrality for cultural relations in the region. It also had a high-quality university as well as a relatively free political climate in the Swedish opinion. A Swedish artist couple – Carl-Otto (C.-O.) Hultén and Birgitta Stenberg-Hultén – who knew Senegal well after extensive travels in the former French colonies of Western Africa, mediated the contacts with President Léopold Sédar Senghor, who in turn invited NUNSKU (Committee for Exhibitions of Contemporary Swedish Art Abroad) to organize an exhibition of Swedish modern art at the Musée dynamique in Dakar.49 Culture in general and the arts in particular were placed at the centre of Senghor’s project for the Senegalese state following decolonisation.50 The resulting Swedish art exhibition, Images du Nord (“Images of the North”), introduced about 125 pieces of art by around twenty Swedish artists to be displayed at the Musée dynamique from 19 April to 27 May 1973.51

Senghor, a well-known intellectual, politician and poet in France before becoming independent Senegal’s first president in 1960 was one of the leading voices of decolonizing Africa, not the least through his contributions to the literary and ideological philosophy of négritude. Unlike other prominent leaders of newly independent states, such as Ghana’s Kwame Nkrumah and Guinea’s Ahmed Sékou Touré, Senghor maintained the importance of continued contacts between France and its former colonies in Africa. In this context, he re-conceptualized the term francophonie in 1962, and proved instrumental in establishing the Organisation

48 Aktuellt om Sverige-information, 1 (1973), 28; see also “Vårt vikingaförflutna efterfrågat Sverige-informationstema,” Aktuellt om Sverige-information, 2 (1973), 16.

The internationale de la Francophonie (OIF) in March 1970 together with, among others, Habib Bourguiba of Tunisia, Hamani Diori of Niger and Prince Norodom Sihanouk of Cambodia. Senghor, a friend of Palme, had visited Sweden already in May 1970 at the invitation of the Swedish universities of Lund, Uppsala and Stockholm to lecture on “Senegalese socialism;” he was also often discussed as a potential Nobel laureate.52

As the leader of the governing Socialist Party of Senegal (Parti Socialiste du Sénégal, PS), Senghor sought to develop African socialism as an alternative to Marxism. Both publicly and in private talks with Swedish diplomats, he emphasized the affinity between Swedish and Senegalese democratic socialism.53 Against this background, it was natural that Senghor perceived the need for something more than an art exhibition. This suited the aims of the Africa project. In response, the Swedish Institute was asked to participate with an information centre about Swedish society in general. Planned by the assisting director of the Swedish Institute Lars Björkbom and the exhibition commissioner Birgitta Stenberg-Hulthén, the centre also offered a reference library, film screenings as well as talks and debates organized by Jan Ivarsson, intendant at the Swedish Cultural Centre in Paris, which were broadcasted in Senegalese media. Additionally, a Swedish film festival ran for a week in April 1973 and the Swedish Institute also invited key personalities of Senegalese public life to Sweden to discuss the events themselves, in part to establish contacts between Senegalese cultural figures and their Swedish counterparts.54

The PR efforts surrounding the Swedish manifestations were considerable, including large banners at central traffic junctures in Dakar as well as massive press, radio, and television coverage – ranging from round-table discussion about “La Suède aujourd’hui” (“Sweden Today”) to a documentary about Sweden, “Baiser douce [sic] de la Suède” (“Sweet kiss from Sweden”). *Le Soleil* published a special Sweden page written by Björkbom, Stenberg-Hultén and the editor-in-chief. Here, between texts presenting the King of Sweden and the country’s geographical peripheral position, Swedish Ambassador Åke Sjölin – officially accredited as “envoy” to Rabat, Nouakchott, Dakar and Banjul – explained Swedish neutrality and support to African liberation movements, linking the Swedish political experiences explicitly to Senghor’s recently announced political programme, underlining the common ideal of a socialist and democratic society.56

In his speech at the inauguration, Senghor returned to this point. Sweden and Senegal, according to Senghor, were, despite their geographical and civilizational differences united in their belief in democratic socialism and he praised the Swedish organizers for situating the exhibition within this context.\textsuperscript{57} An introductory text about Sweden in the exhibition’s catalogue – cited in \textit{Le Soleil} – highlighted the neutral “third position” of the country – beyond the economical-military blocs but between capitalism and socialism.\textsuperscript{58}

As a means of assessing the pilot project success in reaching the Senegalese public through art and films, the Swedish Institute commissioned an enquête. The study provided no conclusive evidence, but its author, Professor Ingvar Holm of Lund University, speculated that Senegalese appreciation of at least certain Swedish cultural expressions followed from \textit{négritude}, an insight which could be of importance for future “art communication” directed towards the emerging Third World.\textsuperscript{59} The political significance of this art communication was also an important topic in Lars Björkbom’s report on the outreach effort in Senegal: while the Senegalese considered the events “clearly an Act of State,” primarily motivated by foreign policy concerns of finding alternatives or at least complements to the French cultural omnipresence in their country, both the Swedish Institute and NUNSKU felt the need to issue statements about the non-official, non-governmental nature of the Swedish manifestations so as to confirm its character as an “\textit{essai d’une communication}” to promote contacts between Swedish and Senegalese art and artists.\textsuperscript{60}

Despite this mismatch between Swedish and Senegalese intents and purposes, Björkbom concluded that the interest that Senegalese authorities had expressed in developing contacts with Sweden could not be mistaken. This interest should be seen in the light of Senghor’s outreach to other neutral countries such as his June 1973 visits to other minor, neutral countries in the North, such as Bruno Kreisky’s Austria and Urho Kekkonen’s Finland, as well as his successive efforts at situating African socialism within the context of international democratic socialism.\textsuperscript{61} These efforts eventually proved successful in 1976, as the PS joined the Socialist International and Senghor himself was elected vice-president, together with, among others, Bruno Kreisky and Olof Palme, proving that bilateral contacts could facilitate multilateral cooperation.

\textsuperscript{57} Léopold Sedar Senghor, “C’est son socialisme démocratique qui rend la Suède proche de nous,” \textit{Le Soleil}, April 20, 1973, 1, 3. Senghor sent the manuscript to Palme, adding that “I think, indeed, that it is within the domain of art and science that Sweden can bring us the most efficient aid – without mentioning the very precious aid that you bring the African liberation movements”. Letter from Léopold Sedar Senghor to Olof Palme, April 28, 1973, 1. ARAB. Olof Palmes arkiv. Brevsamling. 3.2.098. Attachment “Les leçons de l’art suédois. Allocution de M. Léopold Sédar Senghor, Président de la République,” April 19, 1973.


\textsuperscript{60} Björkbom, op. cit., 6–9.

Beaucoup d’affinités in Boumédiène’s Algeria

The Africa project’s first outreach efforts in Senegal in 1973 were soon followed by similar activities in Tunisia and Kenya in 1974. In 1975, a permanent “Africa group” was established within the Swedish Institute to build up expertise on Africa and the developing countries within the framework of Swedish “widened development policy” which emerged during the first years of Palme’s governments in the early 1970s. However, while the Swedish initial outreach to Francophone Africa was carefully designed to emphasize cultural, rather than economic or political ties, Swedish global outreach at this time also has to be read in context of the 1973 oil crisis and the rise of the Global South.

Just as other Western industrialized countries, Sweden was highly dependent upon oil imports for its energy needs by the early 1970s. Subsequently, it was hit hard by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) export embargo in the aftermath of the Yom Kippur War. The resulting oil crisis provided a powerful impetus to the negotiations between the Group of 77 – the South – and the advanced industrial countries of the North in establishing a more just global market between North and South, resulting in the adoption of the so-called New International Economic Order (NIEO) by the UN General Assembly in May 1974. Sweden’s strategy in the face of this new challenge was first to voice its support of the NIEO, as one of the very few Western countries to do so. Second, Swedish representatives actively went on “shopping trips,” seeking bilateral agreements with individual oil producing countries in order to secure the Swedish economy’s minimum demands for fossil fuels, such as oil, gas and coal.

One of the leading promoters of NIEO was oil producing Algeria’s leader, Houari Boumédiène. Having gathered the fourth summit meeting of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in the autumn of 1973, resulting in the so-called Algiers manifesto which formed the basis for the NIEO agenda, Boumédiène had effectively contributed to establish Algiers as the capital of non-alignment. In his capacity of Secretary-General of the NAM since 1973, Boumédiène, just like Palme, profiled himself as a global progressive and promoter of national liberation across the Third World – if from a decidedly more radical platform of Arab socialism and OPEC joint action. In mid-November 1974, Palme made a visit to Algiers. In contrast to Senegal, Sweden and Algeria enjoyed somewhat more long-standing contacts. In 1959, Sweden had been the first Western country to recognize Algeria’s independence, despite vocal

---

65 In US eyes, however, the difference was not always noted at the time, as Sweden hosted US draft dodgers while Algeria provided refuge for Black Panthers.
French protests.66 Already in 1962, Palme travelled to the newly independent Algeria – a visit he referred to during his second trip and which he credited with having alerted him to the need to support national liberation worldwide, influencing his position on Swedish development aid policy.67

Palme did not go alone. No less than some 100 Swedish firms participated in a massive industry exhibition in Algiers coordinated with Palme’s visit, intended to compete with major European firms making offers to the Algerians.68 The Swedish political delegation included some of the Prime Minister’s closest contributors, all of them Francophone.69 The Algerian and Swedish leaders signed a far-reaching blanket order agreement on cooperation between Sweden and Algeria, facilitated by the contacts established by incoming Swedish Ambassador Harald Edelstam – previously posted in Santiago de Chile, where he had provided protection for Chilean refugees during the 1973 Chilean coup d’état and generated much acclaim among anti-imperialist groups worldwide.70 The agreement went in the spirit of the NIEO, foreseeing massive and long-term investments and technology transfers from Sweden in exchange for Algerian raw materials, primarily oil, but also minerals and agricultural products.71

The strengthening of bilateral trade and cooperation between the countries was followed by discussions on current global affairs, where agreements between the two countries were stressed. In his speech at the dinner preceding the agreement – preceded by a surprise encounter with Yasser Arafat, Chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), probably prearranged by Boumediène in view of Arafat’s upcoming visit at the UN in New York72 – Palme underscored the common interest in global progress between guest and host, especially in the view of the possible conflict between rich and poor if the North-South dialogue were to break down. To Palme, the challenges of the future were simply too great for small states to split up along differences in political system or economic wealth, rather calling for bilateral cooperation.73

---

71 SÖ 1975: 6, 1974, nov. 15. Avtal om ekonomiskt, industriellt och tekniskt samarbete.
Third World was redeployed, and echoed in Algerian press. Palme was quoted approvingly in Algerian newspaper headlines as pointing to “beaucoup d'affinités” between Sweden and Algeria, thus situating this relationship within the small state discourse developed by Palme around the same time.\(^\text{74}\) For its part, Algeria’s leading French-language daily *El Moudjahid*, the designated national information newspaper since its start in 1965, viewed the agreement as providing Algeria with an opportunity to develop its own, direct contacts with friendly regimes – such as Sweden – in the Global North, thus moving beyond the confines of Cold War bipolarism and French neo-colonialism.\(^\text{75}\) Similar thoughts were expressed also in the FLN’s weekly *Révolution africaine*, as ambassador Edelstam reported after the visit.\(^\text{76}\) Despite these high-level contacts and vocal professions of common interests, the Swedish business sector remained relatively uninterested in the Algerian market. The strategic, bilateral North-South partnership between Sweden and Algeria did not translate in any more long-standing commercial activities, and the few business contracts which were concluded under the blanket order were troubled by financial and legal problems in the years to come.\(^\text{77}\) In fact, the Swedish Foreign Trade Association (Sveriges Allmänna Utrikeshandelsförening, SAU) closed down its dedicated Africa Bureau in 1972, followed by its Levant Bureau in 1974, just prior to the Swedish Institute setting up its permanent “Africa group” in 1975. As the high expectations for the commercial exchanges between Swedish private business sector and the Global South largely failed to materialize during the early 1970s, the Swedish government took it upon itself to play a more active role in promoting Swedish business operating in the Global South, resulting in an increase of “industrial aid” from 2 per cent to 20 per cent of SIDA’s aid budget from 1970 to 1975.\(^\text{78}\) Meanwhile, Swedish ODA expanded from 128.8 million USD equivalent of 0.47 per cent of Swedish GNP in 1968 to 1.45 per cent – 1134.4 million USD – in 1976, signalling the commitment of Palme’s Sweden to global solidarity during this turning point in the global Cold War.\(^\text{79}\)
Sweden’s dual roles in the global Cold War

To conclude, the increased interest in Palme and Sweden across the Third World from 1969 prompted Swedish public diplomats to reconsider their previously modest outreach efforts in these parts of the world. In the context of the global Cold War, Third World publicity about Sweden provided an interesting mirror for the global opinion on neutral Sweden’s overall international engagement. The three cases of Swedish Cold War global outreach studied here illustrate how metropolitan French interest in Sweden and Palme provided Sweden’s public diplomats with a unique opportunity for global outreach to the Francophonie.

However, the preconditions for bilateral exchanges also determined the scope of Swedish outreach efforts in each case, thus representing distinctive styles of Swedish public diplomacy: In France, transnational channels and contacts abounded and the enthusiasm for Swedish models – suédomanie – had to be somewhat contained for balancing the image. Senegal, by contrast, provided an opportunity for experimental Swedish public diplomacy directed at Africa, introducing ideas of cultural communality and exploring the possibility of Swedish-Senegalese cooperation while avoiding explicit commitments to Senghor’s independent course in the Cold War conflict. In Algeria, finally, the Swedish government could rely upon its own goodwill as a global neutral while securing important oil contracts and technology transfers with one of the leading non-aligned states, but had to contend with the risk of being used by the Algerian leadership for promoting the Palestinian cause or accused by the New Left at home for engaging in exploitative neo-colonialism.

In discussing common North-South problems, Palme programmatically used the notion of “common challenges” uniting “smaller states” in attempt at establishing a discursive platform for cooperation beyond Cold War bipolarism, seeking to bypass East-West tension. These bilateral contacts with other, supposedly small, countries were frequently complemented by multilateral exchanges within international settings, such as the UN system, the NAM, G 77, and the Socialist International. In these combined bilateral and multilateral exchanges, Sweden’s dual roles in the Cold War – as a global neutral and a social model – could be variously enacted. As a global neutral, Sweden sought to build bridges between North and South while maintaining non-alignment in the East-West conflict. As a social model, it exemplified the joining of “capitalist” production with “socialist” redistribution in one of the most advanced and prosperous welfare states of the time. Neither of these roles may have been uniquely Swedish, but their combination certainly was. In the emerging global public opinion, Palme thus came to embody the duality of these Cold War images of Sweden which dominated foreign press coverage of the country during his early years in power.